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Let 

be a prime "eld of p elements and let g be an element of 

of multiplicative order
t modulo p. We show that for any '0 and t5p the distribution of the Dif-
"e}Hellman pairs (x, g) is close to uniform in the Cartesian product 



, where x runs
through
 the residue ring 

modulo t (that is, as in the classical Di$e}Hellman scheme);
 The all k-sums x"a

#2#a

, 14i

(2(i

4n, where a

,2,a3 are
selected at random (that is, an in the recently introduced Di$e}Hellman scheme with
precomputation).
These results are new and nontrivial even if t"p!1, that is, if g is a primitive root. The
method is based on some bounds of exponential sums.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Key =ords: Di$e}Hellman cryptosystem; uniform distribution; precomputation;
exponential sums.1. INTRODUCTION
Let p be a prime number and let 

be a "eld of p elements.
We "x an element g3

of multiplicative order t, that is,
g"1, and gO1, 14s4t!1,
and denote by 

the residue ring modulo t.
We consider the distribution of the Di$e}Hellman pairs (x, g ) in
the Cartesian product 



, where 

is the residue ring modulo t, whenSupported in part by ARC Grant A69700294.
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132 IGOR E. SHPARLINSKIx runs through
 the whole set 

as in the classical Di$e-Hellman scheme;
 the all k-sums x"a

#2#a

, 14i

(2(i

4n, where
a

,2, a

3

are selected at random as in the Di$e}Hellman scheme with
precomputation which has been recently introduced in [4]; see also [22].
We remark that the "rst result concerning x3

is probably well known to
specialists. However, the author is unaware of any mention of it in the
literature; thus it is presented here for the sake of completeness. Moreover, in
the present form it uses some very recent bounds of character sums from [12,
14] (thus the bound we present is probably stronger then the one which could
be known).
Similar results for the RSA pairs (x,x	 ) modulo m"pl, where p and l are
two distinct primes, have recently been obtained in [28] when x runs through
 the group of units H


modulo m as in the classical RSA scheme;
 the all k-products x"a
2a, 14i(2(i4n, wherea

,2, a3H
 are selected at random as in the RSA scheme with precomputa-
tion [4].
Such uniformity of distribution results, although do not have immediate
security implications, still provide some useful information about pseudoran-
domness of the mappings
x3

Pg3

and x3


Px	3


;
see [18]. In particular, it would be disastrous to discover that these pairs are
not uniformly distributed; in this case one could guess their leftmost bits with
higher than average probability. Several other results about the uniformity of
distribution of some pseudorandom generators of cryptographic interest are
given in [9, 10], for the power generator, which includes the RSA generator
and the Blum}Blum}Shub generator, see [3, 7, 17, 19, 25, 30], and in [26, 27]
for the Naor}Reingold generator, see [20].
The uniformity of distribution of the Di.e}Hellman triples (g, g, g) has
been established in [5, 6].
As in [28], our main tool is character sums. In fact we use some new
bounds of character sums with exponential functions which are slight modi"-
cations of those of [14].
We identify 

and 

with the sets 0,2, p!1 and 0,2, t!1, respec-
tively. Thus we study the distribution of the pairs of fractional parts

x
t, 
g
p 
for x from one of the aforementioned sets.
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absolute (we recall that AB is equivalent to A"O(B)).
2. NOTATION AND AUXILIARY RESULTS
First of all we recall the Ho( lder inequality which claims that for any m51
non-negative real numbers u

, v

,2, u
, v
 the bound




u

v

4




u
 






v


(1)
holds for any non-negative real numbers ,  with #"1. In the case
""2 it is also known as the Cauchy inequality.
Given a setM of N points (u, v)3[0, 1], "1,2,N, of the unit square,
we de"ne the discrepancy D(M) of this set as
D(M)"sup
 
A

(B)
N
! (B) ,
where the supremum is taken over all boxes B"[, ][, 	]3[0, 1],
(B)"(!)(	!), and A

(B) is the number of points of this set which
hit B.
According to a standard principle, we can bound the discrepancy D(M) by
bounding the corresponding exponential sums. For arbitrary sets such a rela-
tion is given by the Erdo( s}¹ura& n}Koksma inequality (see Theorem 1.21 of
[8]) which we present in the following implicit form.
For an integer a we de"ne aN"max
a 
, 1.
LEMMA 1. For any integer t51 the bound
D(M)
1
t
#1
N






1
rN sN 



exp(2i(ru#sv)) 
holds.
For an integer m51 we denote
e


(z)"exp(2iz/m)
and de"ne character sums
S(r, s)" 

e

(rx)e

(sg).
134 IGOR E. SHPARLINSKIWe need an extension of the results of [14] which concern the case r"0 to
the general case. Our proof is based on Lemma 3.3 of [14], see also [12], and
is quite similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4 of [14].
For an integer m51 we denote by ¹


the number of solutions of the
equation
g#2#g
"g#2#g
, x

,2, x
 , y,2, y
3 .
LEMMA 2. For any integers m, l51 and any integers r, s with gcd(s, p)"1
the inequality

S (r, s)
4p
¹



¹


t

holds.
Proof. For an integer l51 and 3

denote by Q

() the set
Q

()"(x

,2,x)3 
g#2#g"
and de"ne the exponential sum
Q

(r, )" 
	2	
Q

e

(r(x

#2#x

)).
One easily veri"es that for any u3

Q

(r, g)" 
	2	
Q

e

(r (x

#2#x

))
" 
	2	
Q

e

(r(x

#u)#2#(x

#u )))
"e

(!rlu)Q

(r, );
thus

Q

(r, g) 
"
Q

(r, ) 
.
Obviously



Q

(r, )
4 


Q

(0, ) 
"¹

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


Q

(r, )
4t.
Therefore,

S(r, s) 

" 3Q
 (r, )e (s) "
1
t 



Q


(r, g )e

(sg) 
41
t



Q


(r, ) 
 

e

(sg) .
Hence, from the HoK lder inequality (1), applied with "2l/(2l!1) and
"2l, we obtain

S(r, s)

4 1
t  
Q
(r, ) 





   e(sg
) 

.
For the last sum we have

   e(sg
) 

" 
	2	 		2	


e

(s(g#2#g!g!2!g))"p¹

because the sum over  vanishes if
g#2#gOg#2#g
and is equal to p otherwise. Therefore, applying the HoK lder inequality (1),
applied with "2(l!1)/(2l!1) and "2l!1, we derive

S (r, s) 

"p¹
t   
Q
(r, ) 




"p¹
t   
Q
(r, ) 




Q


(r, ) 



4p¹
t   
Q
(r, ) 





Q


(r, ) 

4p¹


¹

t

 ,
and the desired estimate follows. 
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B(t, p)"
p, if t5p;
pt, if p4t4p;
pt, if p4t4p.
LEMMA 3. ¹he bound
max
		 	


S(r, s)
B(t, p)
holds.
Proof. The bound
max
		 	


S(r, s)
4p
is well known; see [14}16, 23, 24]. In particular, it follows from the "rst
inequality of Lemma 2 if one takes m"l"1 and uses that ¹

"t. We may
now assume that t(0.7p because otherwise the "rst estimate is stronger
than the other two. For such t we have the estimate
¹

t ,
see [12, 14, Lemma 3.3]. Substituting this bound in the inequalities of
Lemma 2 with (m, l )"(2, 1) and with (m, l)"(2, 2) we obtain the desired
statement. 
Let 14k4n be integers. Denote by F
	
the set of binary vectors
u"(u

,2, u)30, 1 of Hamming weight k, that is,
F
	
"u"(u

,2, u)30, 1 
u#2#u"k.
Thus

F
	

"
n
k .
For a given n-dimensional vector a"(a

,2, a)3 and a binary vector
u"(u

,2, u)30, 1 we put
xa(u)"



a

u

,
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=
	
(r, s)" 
a 
 uF	 e(rxa(u))e(sg
au
).
LEMMA 4. ¹he bound
max
		 	

=
	
(r, s)"Ot
n
k
#t
n
kB (t, p)
holds.
Proof. Using the Cauchy inequality and changing the order of summa-
tion, we derive
=
	
(r, s)4t 
a
 uF	 e(rxa(u))e(sg
au
)

"t 
u	vF	

a
e

(rxa(u)!rxa (v))e(sg
au
!sgav
).
The contribution to this sum of each pair with u"v is t. For each pair
u,v3F
	
with uOv we can "nd i and j, 14i(j4n, with u

"v

"1 and
u

"v

"0. Without loss of generality we may assume that i"1, j"2. In
this case xa(u)"A#a and xa (v)"B#a , where A and B do not depend
on a

and a

. Therefore

a
e

(rxa(u)!rxa (v))e(sg
au
!sgav
)
" 
 	2	
e

(r(A!B)) 
 
e

(ra

)e

(sgg)
 

e

(!ra

)e

(!sgg),
whereA and B depend only on u, v and a

,2, a . From Lemma 3 we see that
each inner sum is O(B(t, p)) and the desired result follows. 
We also remark that if gcd(r, t)"1 then
S(r, 0)"0, (2)
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=
	
(r, 0)4t
n
k

. (3)
3. DISTRIBUTION OF THE DIFFIE}HELLMAN PAIRS
Now we are prepared to formulate our main results.
Denote by D the discrepancy of the pairs of fractional parts

x
t, 
g
p , x3 .
THEOREM 5. ¹he bound
D"O(B(t,p) log t)
holds.
Proof. Applying Lemma 1, Lemma 3, and the identity (2), we obtain the
desired result. 
Given integers 14k4n and an n-dimensional vector a"(a

,2, a)3 ,
denote by Da	
the discrepancy of the pairs of fractional parts

xa (u)
t , 
ga u

p , u"(u ,2, u)3F	 ,
where as before
xa (u)"



a

u

.
THEOREM 6. ¹he bound
1
t

a
Da	
"O
n
k
#B(t, p)tlogt
holds.
Proof. Applying Lemma 1, Lemma 4, and the inequality (3), we obtain the
desired result. 
DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFIE}HELLMAN PAIRS 139In particular, we see that there exists an absolute constant C'0 such that
for any 	'0 for a random vector a chosen uniformly at random from


with probability at least 1!	 the bound
Da	
4C	
n
k
#B(t, p)t logt
holds.
One easily veri"es that the above bounds are nontrivial for
t5p with any fixed '0 and sufficiently large p.
4. REMARKS
It seems plausible that using an appropriate modi"cation of Theorem 5.5
of [14] (extended to sums S(r, s)) one can prove that for almost all primes
p analogues of Theorems 5 and 6 hold which are nontrivial for much smaller
values of t.
Even studying the distribution of only the "rst component, that is, just
vectors xa (u), u3F	 , is of interest; see [22]. Several uniformity of distribu-
tion results about the vectors xa (u) when u runs through all n-dimensional
binary vectors [1, 2, 11, 13, 21, 22, 29] are known and have some crypto-
graphic applications.
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